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ABSTRACT 
 Despite the importance of human capital to the Department of Defense and U.S. 
Army, we do not have much research on civilian attrition—the reduction of workforce 
due to termination, resignation, retirement or death. Identifying attrition patterns helps 
organizations assess policy effects and organizational culture and forecast future 
workforce needs. This study analyzes attrition rates for Department of the Army (DA) 
civilian employees for the calendar year (CY) 2009 using a logistic regression model and 
multinomial logistic regression model and finds a 5.5% attrition rate for DA civilians in 
CY 2009. The study also finds that younger and older employees have a higher attrition 
rate, which corresponds to previous findings in our literature review. This study also 
shows that employees with lower credit federal service time (FS) were more likely to 
leave compared to those with a higher FS. Higher attrition among employees with less FS 
may be due to the fact that these employees are not fully invested in federal service. The 
study provides data and recommends helping DA leaders assess attrition patterns and 
causes among DA civilian employees which will, in turn, help to forecast future DA 
civilian employees’ strength. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) civilian workforce offers critical support to our 
armed forces. A big organization, DoD employs nearly 800,000 civilians (DoD, 2015) so 
effective workforce management is essential to meeting organizational goals, current and 
future. The DoD uses tools such as policies to manage DoD civilian workforce (Cho & 
Lewis, 2012). Analysis of attrition, that is the reduction of the workforce due to 
termination, resignation, retirement, or death, can help measure the effectiveness of these 
tools. Better tools allow planners to better predict overall organizational health, culture, 
cohesiveness, and job satisfaction. Attrition data can also measure the effectiveness of 
recruitment, retention, and management processes. While the idea of quitting sounds 
negative, when controlled, attrition can have a positive impact. For example, if an 
employee has tenure in a high paying position but is not productive, their attrition would 
lower personnel costs making room for a new employee.  
This study examines attrition among DoD civilian employees who worked for the 
U.S. Army in the first quarter of calendar year (CY) 2009. Specifically, we study any 
person who appeared in our data with a general schedule (GS) and band employee rank 
classification, then left in CY 2009 through termination, transfer, resignation, retirement, 
or death. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Learning attrition patterns can help DoD control cost, help in future planning, and 
mitigate contributing factors. Though attrition can be a positive, attrition can also mean the 
loss of critical skills, the loss of managerial skills, the creation of a knowledge gap, and a 
lower productivity level. 
In recent years, the DoD civilian workforce’s challenges include drawdowns, 
policy changes, and an aging population (Dye & Lapter, 2013). The U.S. Army, the largest 
DoD civilian workforce employer, has experienced the largest effect from these challenges. 
After every war, the Army faces budget cuts that lead to workforce reduction to reduced 
labor costs (Cho & Lewis, 2012). To reduce the workforce, the Army uses force shaping 
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tools such as early retirement, pay freezes, and hiring freezes. These tools can have 
negative long-term effects on the workforce. Hiring freezes shut young employees out of 
the system, increasing the number of older employees, creating the risk of having a 
percentage of aging personnel.  
An aging workforce is a particular issue of concern for DoD because most baby 
boomers are approaching retirement age. Being eligible to retire does not always translate 
to actual retirement as previous studies have shown. Only 9 percent of those eligible to 
retire actually retire each year (Cho & Lewis, 2012). Studying attrition patterns based on 
retirement makes it possible for organizational leaders to forecast future workforce needs 
and mitigate the loss of critical and managerial skills. The retirement rate between both 
employees at GS-15 pay grade and the Senior Executive Service (SES) was almost double 
the average retirement rate for the overall federal workforce since FY 2008 (Dye & Lapter, 
2013). Most of the personnel retiring have tenure and hold managerial positions, and the 
loss of managerial experience negatively affects the DoD. 
Attrition is also expensive for any organization. Pay freezes can cause employees 
to leave depending on the job market outside of the federal government. When 
unemployment is low, employees experiencing pay freezes have more job options 
especially when there is an opportunity for better pay and job promotions. This can be 
attributed to talent loss which leads to overall mission ineffectiveness, training and 
recruiting of new employees cost among others. Talent loss or leaving a position vacant 
can cause job dissatisfaction that increases the probability that other employees may attrite. 
One study points out that when people leave, they cause others to work harder and this 
contributes to more attrition (Goswami & Jha, 2012). When people migrate to other 
employers, the DoD incurs extra costs for recruiting, selecting, and hiring new employees. 
These employees have to be trained which can be costly as well depending on job type and 
previous experience. There is no concrete amount of DoD employee replacement cost 
although, based on private sector estimates, the cost could run from 50 percent to 200 
percent of the employees’ annual salary depending on the position (Cho & Lewis, 2012). 
It is also important to note that, due to the recession of years 2007–2009, some of the people 
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eligible for retirement may not have been able to retire due to their investments taking a hit 
from the economic recession. 
B. PROBLEM AREAS AND RESEARCH GAP 
The literature review in this study shows that, although Army attrition is widely 
studied, researchers have concentrated mainly on uniformed personnel rather than on Army 
civilian employees. The few studies look at attrition based on DoD policies and aging 
workforce and are not specific to the Department of Army (DA). The U.S. Army is the 
largest organization in the DoD with its own micro-culture, so analyzing its civilian 
attrition is important. 
C. PURPOSE 
Human capital is an important resource for U.S. Army mission accomplishment. 
Identifying factors that cause attrition and their impacts help leaders to understand their 
organization better and forecast workforce needs. This study identifies the employees who 
meet retirement eligibility and actually retire in CY 2009. We identify employees who 
leave in CY 2009 due to other factors other than retirement such as resignation and 
termination or disciplinary issues. Finally, we estimate the probability of an employee 
leaving in CY 2009 as a function of his age, retirement eligibility and other demographic 
factors. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study uses a logistic regression model to estimate the probability of attrition 
in 2009. The Army Analytics Group Research Facilitation Lab (AAG-RFL) through the 
Person-Event Data Environment (PDE) provided the data, which originated from Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The data comprises Army civilian master files, which 
are quarterly snapshots, and Army civilian transaction files, which are transactions added 
to civilian employee records each time a new transaction occurs. The scope for this study 
is DA civilians employed in the CY 2009 and had a quarterly snapshot in the first quarter 
2009. This data helps identify factors that contribute to attrition and the attributes of 
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employees most likely to attrite. Variables analyzed in this study are age, federal credited 
service time, sex and education.  
E. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Overall attrition in this study is 5.5 percent. This study shows higher attrition among 
younger employees, an attrition slow down and then increase after an employee turns 50 
years of age. This pattern is consistent with previous studies. The study also shows that just 
because an employee meets retirement eligibility it does not mean that they would retire. 
Our data is limited due to lack of personal identifiable information (PII) such as number of 
dependents, life insurance and Unit Identification Codes (UIC). This information would 
have been useful to assess organizational effectiveness such as organizational culture as 
well as effects of changes in policies. Lack of life insurance or type of health insurance 
enrollment are indicators that the employee might be a second income earner, which could 
lead to a higher likelihood of attrition. Our study only covers a span of one year. This limits 
our ability to tell how long it takes a retirement eligible employee to retire. It is also 
impossible for us to tell how economic and policy changes affect attrition rate in our study. 
However, this study sets the stage for forecasting the number of retirements and separations 
in the next calendar year. Future studies should compare attrition from different years with 
CY 2009 to measure effects of economic and policy changes. 
F. SUMMARY 
The DA has conducted extensive attrition studies on attrition for active duty 
personnel in comparison to DA civilian attrition. Data used in this study is also limited in 
the sense that key information such as personal identifiable information (PII) is not 
available. This information is important for future studies in order to identify organizational 
systematic issues that leads to attrition as well as predict personnel decision to attrite or not 
to attrite. This study reviews past studies on attrition, organizational theories, policy 
changes, data and methodology, results and then conclusion. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
DoD civilians play an important role in the defense of our nation in support of the 
Armed forces. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and other DoD agencies have nearly 
750 occupations positions that offer diverse careers (DoD, 2015). In recent years, the DoD 
civilian workforce has faced attrition challenges due to drawdowns, budget cuts, and aging 
population among others. In this chapter, we review past studies conducted on causes of 
attrition, causes of resignation, aging workforce, theories of organizational theories, and 
generational differences.  
A. PAST STUDIES 
Although DoD civilian workforce has been in existence since 1776 (Army Career, 
n.d.), there are very few studies conducted on civilian workforce turnover or retention in 
comparison to active duty military personnel. Most studies addressing DoD civilian 
workforce discussed effects of changes in policies such as hiring freezes, pay freezes, GS 
system changes to band pay systems, drawdowns, an aging workforce, and generational 
differences.  
1. Drawdowns 
Historically, the DoD downsizes after every war. This is the case in the 90’s during 
President Clinton’s administration and then again during President Obama’s. Empirical 
studies of turnover in the federal workforce have found that government-downsizing 
policies (Ertas, 2015) disproportionately affects younger employees. Stability and 
attractiveness of DoD jobs lessens during this period. Younger workers tend to migrate to 
more appealing positions outside of DoD because they have higher quit rates on average, 
because they are more flexible in terms of career choice and typical life obligations such 
as family and finances (Ertas, 2015). Tools used to help in downsizing are hiring freeze, 
pay freeze, use of voluntary separation incentive payments (VSIP), and voluntary early 
retirement authority (VERA). These tools can accelerate the rate of aging Army civilian 
workforce by reducing the number of younger people hired or would like to work for the 
Army. Lytell et al. (2015) state that, 
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DoD’s reliance on hiring constraints and voluntary attrition to achieve 
civilian reductions in the 1990s led to demographic, as well as skill, 
imbalances. In particular, the drawdown resulted in an older civilian 
workforce. The median age of DoD civilian employees rose from 41 in 1989 
to 46 in 1999, and the number of civilians under the age of 31 dropped by 
76 percent during the same period, while the number of those aged 51–60 
remained about the same. 
2. DoD Budget Cuts 
DoD budget cuts forces agencies to implement ways to control spending by offering 
early retirement options, retirement plan changes, hiring freezes, cuts to training, 
eliminating overtime as well as bonuses. Implementation of these policies may cause 
unwanted results by extrinsically affecting their employees. This leads to job 
dissatisfaction that can cause an increase attrition rate. The Budget Control Act of 2011 
forced different measures such as pay freezes, early retirement options authorization, cuts 
to training, elimination of overtime or bonuses and furloughs (Dye & Lapter, 2013). Due 
to Budget Act of 2011, the Army announced that they would need to reduce 40,000 soldiers 
from a total force of 490,000 to 450,000 and cut 17,000 civilian jobs as part of their force 
structure and stationing decisions (DoD, 2015). 
Change in policy does not have to be a negative. The DoD uses early retirement 
and special incentive options as a way to control the attrition rate. Most people who are 
eligible for early retirement are normally on a high ranking meaning higher pay. By getting 
them to retire, the DoD saves on personnel cost. Some employees who meet this eligibility 
criterion and have other better opportunities might take advantage of these authorizations.  
Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment (VSIP) option is attractive to an employee who 
was not planning to stay on as a federal employee. Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA) is 
the early retirement option. Most VERA eligible employee meet creditable federal time but 
are short in years. Most people who meet this category are employees with honorable prior 
service. If a competitive market exists in the economy, it is easy for an employee who has 
met the early retirement option to choose early retirement when offered. 
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B. RESIGNATION 
Resignation happens when an employee voluntarily chooses to terminate their 
employment from an organization. Understanding factors that lead to an employee 
resignation is important to an employer if they want to retain and attract good employees. 
Lack of job and financial security is one of the drivers that would cause employees to resign 
their positions in search of a more stable opportunity. Changes in pay or talks about pay 
reduction, is a deterrence to personnel who possess critical skills. This may cause retention 
and recruiting setbacks for DoD agencies. Job and financial insecurities may be a result of 
sequestrations, pay freezes and retirement changes. In 2013, sequestration led to unpaid 
furloughs for some civil service workers, including those at the DoD (Asch, Mattock, & 
Hosek, 2014a). Asch et al. (2014a) conducted a study to see how pay freezes retirement 
plan changes affected DoD civilian employees retention in the long run. The results showed 
that among GS employees with four years of college or more, only 7.3 percent projected 
to stay with the federal service despite time in federal service, which was lower than had 
there been no pay freeze.  
Lack of meaningful work leads to disengaged employees that causes dissatisfaction 
and raises the odds for an employee to resign (Dye & Lapter, 2013). DoD policies have not 
evolved to accommodate younger generations. Difference in priorities and a feeling of lack 
of inclusion may lower employee’s motivation and job satisfaction and cause 
resignation. The economy has also improved with low rates of unemployment. This means 
that DoD compensation packet has to compete with the market otherwise recruiting and 
retention becomes more and more difficult.  
C. AGING WORKFORCE 
The aging workforce is a continuous concern for the Army civilian workforce. 
Federal employment grew by 15 percent between 1965 and 1985, which coincides with the 
time baby boomers entered the workforce (Cho & Lewis, 2011). This employment surge 
of mainly baby boomers are currently eligible for retirement. Twenty-six percent of the 
Federal workforce was 55 years or older in fiscal (FY) 2013 compared with 16 percent in 
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FY 2000 (Dye & Lapter, 2013). Other factors that have contributed to the aging workforce 
is the Federal employment downsizing.  
An aging workforce tends to mean a higher retirement rate. This thins the pool of 
organizational knowledge, contributing to a skills gap among high-skilled workers such as 
economists, financial auditors, acquisitions, science, technology, engineering, mathematics 
and human resources (Dye & Lapter, 2013). Army civilian employees eligible for 
retirement are mostly in management positions. Retirement of these employees causes loss 
of managerial skills. 
D. THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES 
Work environment plays a major factor on employee retention, recruitment and job 
satisfaction (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). Employees resign when other 
opportunities offer greater rewards than their current job. Rewards in this case may include 
better pay, shorter commute to work and closer proximity to family. The opportunity cost 
an employee would incur by changing jobs is an example of cost in this case study (Cho & 
Lewis, 2012). It is imperative for an organization to understand what motivates an 
employee to stay in an organization or to resign due to high cost of recruitment, selecting, 
hiring and training new employees not to mention knowledge gap when a seasoned 
employee chooses to retire. A work environment in which an employee experiences job 
satisfaction must meet both intrinsic and extrinsic needs of an employee.   
Maslow’s motivation theory defines these needs best and states that lack of either 
could lead to lack of job satisfaction and in the end cause the employee to resign (Strategies 
for Managing Change, n.d.). Organizations need to understand what motivates an employee 
to stay in an organization or to resign due to high cost of recruitment, selecting, hiring and 
training new employees not to mention knowledge gap when a seasoned employee chooses 
to retire. A work environment in which an employee experiences job satisfaction must meet 
both intrinsic and extrinsic needs of an employee. Intrinsic needs are inborn.  
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1. Maslow’s Motivation Theory 
Abraham Maslow developed the famous motivation theory—also known as the 
hierarchy of needs—between 1943 and 1954 (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). This 
theory states that human beings have a hierarchy needs and must fulfill individual needs 
before they tackle other complex needs (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). Maslow 
motivation theory is a pyramid with five steps (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.).The 
steps are as follows starting from lowest level to highest level: physiological, safety, 
belongingness and love, esteem and self-actualization needs as seen below. 
a. Physiological Needs 
These are the basic needs for an individual to survive (Strategies for Managing 
Change, n.d.). These are the primary needs in Maslow’s pyramid. Examples of 
physiological needs are food, water, air among others. Lack of these needs leave human 
beings feeling unsettled and they must take care of these needs in order to think about other 
things.  
b. Safety Needs 
In the second level of Maslow theory pyramid are security and safety. Security and 
safety are important to human beings because they establish stability and consistency in 
our lives. Financial and physical security, mental and physical health and a safe 
environment are among safety needs. Safety programs and flexible schedules can help met 
safety needs (Fore, Reedy, Sanchez-Vahamonde, & Whelan, 2016).  
c. Belongingness and Love Needs 
Belongingness and love needs are part of psychological human needs. Human 
beings all over the world have a need to feel loved and accepted. Organizations should 
incorporate networking as part of orientation to allow new employees to meet old 
employees. This encourages human connection as well as transfer of knowledge. 
Transferring knowledge in an informal setting allows new employees to engage without 
fear of apprehension. Most organizations have new employee orientation programs to fulfil 
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this need. Unfortunately, orientation programs focus on data dumping or organizational 
compliance training sessions (Goswami & Jha, 2012).  
Organizations can create high-quality connections through a change of culture and 
power of values. A culture that values and rewards teamwork, value development of 
people, value the whole person, and finally value respect and dignity of others is a way of 
making employees have a sense of belongingness.  
d. Esteem Needs 
Self-esteem results from competence or mastery of a task as well as good opinion 
of other people (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). This in return reduces the feeling 
of inferiority and negativity. To fulfill this need, employers can provide feedback and 
recommendations on an employees’ performance to allow the employee room for 
improvement. Having a reward system for employees for a job well done also boosts the 
employees’ morale and provide motivation.  
e. Self-Actualization 
It is difficult to determine one’s full potential. Maslow believed that when people 
have all their physiological and psychological needs met, they tend to progress towards 
fulfillment of their full potential (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). Self-actualization 
is more personal than the other needs. One has pursue peace within and outside oneself, 
appreciate life and all it brings, self-fulfillment and knowledge among others. 
2. Hertzberg Motivation Theory 
Hertzberg motivation theory also coined, as the two-factor theory believes that 
people have higher and lower levels of needs. These two factors are motivation 
(satisfaction) factors and hygiene (dissatisfaction) factors (Education Business Articles, 
2016). These two factors have no relationship with each other where lack of one does not 
mean that you have the other factor (Education Business Articles, 2016). Leaders must 
ensure to fulfill these two factors for their organizations to be successful.  
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a. Hygiene Factors 
Although hygiene factors are essential for job motivation, they do not lead to long-
term job satisfaction (Strategies for Managing Change, n.d.). Examples of hygiene factors 
are policies, pay, work relationship, work conditions, status, job security, leadership and 
policies. Hygiene factors could affect attrition and recruitment of new employees. These 
factors are extrinsic to work. Pay freezes enacted in the FY 2011 by the DoD, not only 
affected pay increases but retirement compensation as well. Asch, B. et al. (2014b) in their 
study note that DoD civilian workforce experienced three consecutive years of pay freezes 
since 2011 with a 1 percent pay increase for 3 consecutive years from 2014 and personal 
contribution towards retirement rose to 4.4 percent. The rise in personal contribution was 
to help the government on the cost of FERS at 12.7 percent of pay (Asch et al., 2014b). 
DoD as an employer needs to make sure that the pay and compensation package can 
compete with the market if they want to retain and recruit quality employees. People enjoy 
workplaces where they feel like they feel recognized and compensated for their effort. 
Organization norms are also a big factor. Leaders must encourage quality wok 
relationships, provide great work conditions and create policies that are fair to everyone.  
b. Motivation Factors 
Motivation factors not only yield positive job satisfaction but also are intrinsic to 
work. These factors inspire employees to give their best job performance improving the 
organization’s bottom line. Examples of motivational factors are job advancement, 
responsibility, achievement, growth, and recognition. Since motivation factors focus more 
on job satisfaction, it is important that leaders empower their employees, delegate as well 
as improve job roles to keep workers motivated. 
Lack of training leads to poor performance therefore no rewards. This can lead to 
lack of confidence for the employee and employer. This is due to failed expectations 
leading to job dissatisfaction. Providing feedback to employees shortens the feedback loop, 
helps to keep performance level high, and reinforces positive behavior (Goswami & Jha, 
2012). Setting unrealistic goals or realistic goals without any guidance on how to 
accomplish the goals causes employees’ frustration and lowers job motivation. 
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Personal expectations such as growth and upward mobility are also important to 
employees. Studies have shown that “employees do not leave if they feel that the work they 
are doing is important, if they are happy on and off work, and they have a good relationship 
with their supervisor” (Fore et al., 2016). Most people prefer a challenging position that 
broadens the base of their domain expertise to money. Lack of growth may make the 
employee feel stifled and lead to resignation. Personal needs are important as highlighted 
by both Maslow and Hertzberg. Lack of work balance and high levels of stress makes 
employees stressed out and lead to exiting the organization for a more relaxed pace 
opportunity. 
E. GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
DA civilian employees with prior military service takes up to 30% of the total DoD 
civilian workforce. The other seventy percent of the employees either come straight from 
college or transfer from other organizations in the federal government. Due to the range of 
ages, Army civilian workforce has a range of age groups such as baby boomers, ‘Gen Xers’ 
and the millennials. Baby boomers are people who were born between the years of 1946 
and 1964. ‘Generation Xers’ are people born in 1965 to 1979 and millennials are the work 
force born 1980 to 2000 (Miller-Merrell, 2016). Of all generations represented in the work 
place today, millennials tend to require the most attention. They emphasize preference for 
unconfined careers, work-life balance and extrinsic rewards (Ertas, 2015). A preference for 
unconfined careers and the fact that they have not invested a lot of time in their jobs makes 
them a high target for attrition. Studies have shown that attrition rates are higher among 
employees who have less than 5 years of federal experience (Cho & Lewis, 2012). 
Different generations require different retention and recruitment strategies. In a 
Federal Employee Viewpoint survey conducted in 2012, Baby Boomers prefer financial 
incentives while ‘Gen Xers’ and millennials prefer promotion and job advancement as well 
as workplace flexibility programs (Dye & Lapter, 2013). A customized retention strategy 
for mission critical workers to cater to difference in priorities for different workforce 
generations is essential.  
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Engaged employees are involved and committed in their work, personal growth and 
organizational growth (Dye & Lapter, 2013). These types of employees do not require 
being micromanaged. They invest in furthering their organization’s interests, working 
smarter and are willing to put in extra time to get the job done. Leaders can improve the 
job satisfaction for this generation by increasing the motivation factors and reduce hygiene 
factors. With an aging workforce headed to retirement, the majority of workforce will 
comprise of mostly millennials eventually. This makes retention of millennial workforce 
critical. 
F. SUMMARY 
Our literature review discusses DA civilian employees’ causes and patterns of 
attritions from past studies, effects drawdowns after wars, effects of budget cuts, aging 
workforce, organizational theories and generational differences. This information gives us 
a focus on patterns we need to look for in our data in Chapter III. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses data collection and methodology used to study DA civilian 
attrition rate in CY 2009. AAG-RFL through the PDE provided the data, which originate 
from DMDC as stated earlier in Chapter I. The data is comprised of Army civilian master 
files, which are quarterly snapshots, and Army civilian transaction files. The logistic 
regression model in Chapter IV uses the dependent and independent variables from this 
data. This chapter covers summary statistics and data description. 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This section describes variables used to measure attrition of DA civilians in CY 
2009. Data available in the PDE contains monthly employment snapshots from 2005 to the 
first quarter of 2017 and transaction records from 2007 to the first quarter of 2017 (Buttery, 
Klingensmith, & Whitaker, 2018). The data of interest are all quarterly snapshots and 
transaction records between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2009 for employees with a 
31 March 2009 snapshot record. A random sample of 100,000 DoD civilian employees is 
taken from the original data. A subset containing of only DA civilians with a rank General 
Schedule (GS) or BAND. This subset has 23,197 records.  
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Institution Review Board (IRB) determined 
this data to be free of PII, so the project is not human subject research according to the 
federal definition of research with human subjects 32 CFR 219. AAG-RFL also scrambled 
the UICs and Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) codes to ensure the command and locations 
are unidentifiable.  
Variables used in this study are age, date of birth, gender, start dates, rank codes, 
education, first transaction date, active duty dates, last transaction date and last transaction 
details. Age is computed by finding the difference between the snapshot date 
(SNPSHT_DATE) and the birth date in the PDE (DATE_BIRTH_PDE) then dividing the 
result by 365.25 to convert the results to years or by using given PN_AGE_ QY value 
(Buttery et al., 2018). Gender assignment is as follows: M for males, F for females, Z for 
personnel who switch genders and NA for missing genders (Buttery et al., 2018). Rank 
16 
codes used are GS and BAND. BAND rank is used because our data of interest falls in a 
period when DoD transitioned GS pay system to National Security Personnel System 
(NSPS) before it was repealed by the authority of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for FY 2010 (Clark & Whitman, 2011). 
The last transaction date and details are taken from an employee’s “last” transaction 
record up to the first quarter of 2017. The transaction details field describes the nature of 
the transaction. Employees whose last transaction date is before 31 December 2009 and 
whose transaction details indicate separation of some type have clearly separated from 
DoD employment in 2009. 
Last transaction details indicating separation codes in this data are: death, 
reassignment, removal, resignation, resignation-in lieu of involuntary action, retirement 
disability, retirement-in lieu of involuntary action, retirement special option, retirement 
voluntary, separation RIF, separation US, separation incentive, termination, appointment 
termination, termination expiration of appointment, termination sponsor relocating, 
termination during probation period and transfer. Initial results show that 5.5% employees 
leave by the end of CY 2009. Of these, 14.3 percent of retired; 11 percent are forced out of 
federal service through termination during probation period, removed from current 
positions, resign to avoid removal; 34.1 percent separated due to death, resignation, 
separation incentive or separation RIF and separation U.S. 
However, some employees have a final snapshot record in 2009 with no subsequent 
records after 2009 and no indication from their last transaction details that they have 
separated. We count these individuals as separated too. Note that an individual who is 
employed by DA at the beginning of 2009, then in 2009 is appointed to a position in 
different DoD component is also counted as separated. Of the 23,197 employees, 1,280 
separate in 2009. Table 1 lists the last transaction details for these 1,280. We have 
organized the transaction details into four groups: retired, removal, other separation and 
not separation. The last group includes transaction details of employees whose last 
transaction details does not tell us why they left. 
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Table 1. Last Transaction Details for DA Employees Who Left 
in 2009 
B. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
Logistic regression models the probability that a binary response or dependent 
variable takes value 1 as a function of one or more explanatory or independent variables 
(Faraway, 2006). Our logistic regression model is used to examine the relationship between 
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the probability of attrition in CY 2009 and explanatory variables based on age, gender 
(Sex), federal years in service (FS), years until eligible for retirement(yearsIR), education 
level (Ed), rank code (RankCode), and whether the employee has prior active duty military 
service or not (PE). Logistic regression is often used to classify individuals using 
their estimated probability of attrition. Individuals whose estimated probabilities are 
greater than some threshold (often 0.5) are classified as attrited. We do not use the results 
of a logistic regression for classification; instead we use the estimated probabilities to 
give us a sense of which types of individuals are more likely to attrite. 
Rather than use, numeric versions of age, FS, and yearsIR we create categorical 
versions. Since age ranges from 17 years of age to 87.42 years, we partition age into 
categories with interval boundaries as follows: 17, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, and 
90 to construct the categorical variable ageFAC. FS has a range of 0 years to 58 years. The 
FSFAC explanatory variable is a partition of FS in interval partitions with the following 
boundaries: 0, 5, 10, 15, 25, and 60. Similarly, the yearsIRFAC is a categorical version of 
yearsIR with interval boundaries: 0, 1,5,10, and 40. The yearsIRFAC variable represents 
how many years an employee has until they are eligible to retire. Ed is a factor with four 
levels: 0 representing people without a high school diploma, 1 with high school diploma, 
2 with a four year degree and 3 with a master’s level or higher education. We fit a logistic 
regression with the following explanatory variables: AgeFAC, yearsIRFAC, FSFAC, Sex, 
RankCode, Ed and PE. Below is the description of both response and explanatory variables. 
1. Response Variables Descriptions
The response variable, y, in this study is an indicator variable for attrition. In this 
study, y is defined as 1 if an employee leaves DA in CY 2009 and 0 otherwise. We note 
that classifying separation by type can yield an attrition response variable with more than 
two levels. For example, the variable specifying retirement, termination, and resignation 
among those who leave in CY 2009 is three-level dependent variables. Retirement is a 
combination of people who left due to volunteer, special option, and disability retirement. 
Termination is a combination of people who left due to removal, resignation or retirement 
in lieu of involuntary action, regular termination, and termination during probationary 
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period. Resignation contains everybody else who left at the end of CY 2009 and we do not 
know why.  
2. Explanatory Variables  
This data has three sets of explanatory variables: demographic, job, and 
compensation variables. Demographic variables in this data include age on 31 March 2009 
and gender. Job variables in this data are years of credited federal service and retirement 
eligibility on 31 March 2009. Years of credited federal service includes prior military 
service served honorably, time in other federal agencies as well as time in DoD. This data 
contains 3,356 employees with prior service. 
Retirement eligibility and separation options are determined using outlined 
guidelines in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). There are three types of 
retirement eligibility categories: voluntary retirement, disability retirement, and special 
option retirement eligibility. Special option retirement falls under special separations 
authorizations exercised during drawdown period (OPM, n.d.). 
a. Voluntary Retirement Eligibility 
According to OPM, the minimum retirement age is 60 and 62 years with a minimum 
of 20 and 5 years of service respectively. An employee has to meet an age requirement that 
depend on their birth year in order to retire under Minimum Requirement Age (MRA) 
authorization with a minimum service of 30 years with no special requirements or a 
minimum of 10 years with their annuity reduced by 5 percent yearly until the employee 
reaches 62 years of age (OPM, n.d.). An employee’s birth year determines MRA (OPM, 
n.d.). People born before 1948, have MRA 55. People born between 1948 and 1952, have 
MRA 55 increased by 2 months increment for each additional year. People born between 
1953 and 1964, have MRA 56 (OPM, n.d.). People born between 1965 and 1969 have 
MRA 56 increased by 2 months increment for each additional year and finally for birthdays 
after 1970, MRA is 57(OPM, n.d.). This data shows that we have 153 employees who 
retired voluntary in CY 2009. 
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b. Disability Voluntary Retirement 
An employee can only apply for disability retirement after he or she has provided 
their organization medical documents stating that they cannot perform their current duties 
and their organization cannot accommodate them or reassign them (OPM, n.d.). FERS 
annuity requirements for disability retirement eligibility is any age with 18 months service 
time (OPM, n.d.). Preliminary studies of our data shows that we have 29 employees who 
left by the end of 2009 under this category.  
c. Special Option Separations 
(1) Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA)  
VERA has a minimum age and service requirements of at least age 50 with 20 
years’ of “creditable federal service or any age with at least 25 years’ creditable federal 
service” (OPM, n.d.). To qualify for VERA, “an employees must be currently working in 
VERA authorized position for at least 30 days and leave the organization during the 
authorized VERA period” (OPM, n.d.). Based on our data, there is 1 employee who left 
federal employment under VERA requirements during our observation period.  
(2) Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments (VSIP) 
An employee must be working continuously for at least three years in a position 
under the executive branch of the federal government (OPM, n.d.). The employee seeking 
VSIP eligibility must apply and receive approval from their agency if it is offering VSIP 
(OPM, n.d.). Our data contains 21 employees who fall under this category. Lack of UICs 
and duty location limits any expansive studies on these personnel. It is impossible to tell 
which organizations were authorized VSIP. It is also possible for organizations to choose 
which departments within the organization they will implement VSIP. 
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C. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CY 2009 DA CIVILIAN DATA 
Table 2 shows summary statistics of CY 2009 DA civilian employee data, 
53.87 percent are males. The average age of the employees is 46.74 with a range between 
17.5 and 87.5 years. Our data also shows that we have an average of 12 years before 
retirement eligibility most employees are GS 1–9, and none are GS 14–15. Age is taken to 
be the age of the employee on 31 December 2009, it is approximated using the birth year, 
and month found in the master file quarterly snapshots. The age distribution is given in 
Figure 1. 
Table 2. Demographics Summary Statistics CY 2009 DA Civilians 
Variables   Percentages Range Mean 
Sex:         
  Female 46.13     
  Male 53.87     
Years of Federal Service     17.5-87.5 46.74 
Age     0.02-58.03 14.9 
Rank Code:         
  GS 1-9 53.28     
  GS10-11 15.65     
  GS 12-13 24.21     
  GS 14-15 0     
  BAND 6.85     




Figure 1. Histogram for Age Distribution 
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Years to immediate retirement is the minimum time required for an employee to 
retire given their age and FS. Figure 2 shows years to immediate retirement distribution.  
 
Figure 2. Histogram for Years to Immediate Retirement Distribution 
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FS is the difference between 2009-12-30 and the recorded date that an employee 
joined the federal service in the first transaction or first file. Figure 3 shows FS distribution. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram for Credited Federal Service Distribution 
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D. DATA LIMITATIONS 
The goal for this study is to identify factors affecting attrition concentrating mainly 
on retirement. Studies have shown that retirement eligibility does not mean that these 
employees will retire. There are other factors that affect decision to retire. An example of 
these factors are economy as a whole, locality, health insurance, dependents, and job 
position. DMDC data lacks some useful variables such as full ZIP codes, number of 
dependents and marital status data, and finally health care insurance enrollments, UICs and 
billet codes that could help us predict human behavior in retirement trends. For example, a 
person not enrolled in health care insurance may be a second income earner with an 
increased probability of leaving a job. Locality might also help identify organizational 
systematic issues or highlight opportunity cost by comparing job opportunities between 
federal employment and local economy. BAND ranking system did not identify levels 
employees in our data belonged making it difficult to compare with GS ranking system. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter covers CY 2009 DA civilian data provided in the PDE. It provides 
preliminary statistics that help build both logistic regression model in Chapter IV.  
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This chapter discusses the logistic regression model fit to the sample of civilian 
employed by DA in the first quarter of CY 2009. The model estimates the probability of 
attrition of attrition in CY 2009.  
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
We start by fitting logistic regression model with seven categorical explanatory 
variables ageFAC, yearsIRFAC, FSFAC, Sex, Ed, RankCode and PE described in Chapter 
III. Because the sample size 23,197 is so large, we expect formal hypothesis testing to yield 
statistical significance even when there is no practical difference in the null hypothesis and 
alternative hypothesis fits. To check for practical differences, we randomly select 20% of 
the records to serve as a test or validation set. The 80% remaining training I the set used to 
fit models. 
The first logistic regression model fit is additive. It contains no interactions among 
explanatory variables. The second model fit includes all possible interaction terms. A large 
sample Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) rejects the null hypothesis of the additive model in 
favor of the model with two-way interactions with a p-value < 0.0001. However to check 
the practical difference differences between the additive model and the one with 
interactions, we compute and plot Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for both 
models using the 20 percent validation set. We use this validation set rather than the 
original training set to compensate for potential overfitting by the large model with two-
way interactions. Figure 4 shows the validation set ROC curves for additive model (green) 
and the model with interactions (red). The ROC curve for the additive is a bit below that 
of the model with interactions, but there is very little difference in the two curves. This 
suggests that for practical purposes, for this data, the additive model suffices. 
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Figure 4. ROC Curves for Additive, Interaction and Random Forests Models 
We then use backwards elimination to eliminate, in order, the explanatory variables 
prior service (PE), RankCode and Sex. This leaves a logistic regression model with four 
categorical explanatory variables ageFAC, FSFAC, yearsIRFAC and Ed. 
In addition, as a separate model fitting check, we fit random forests (Breiman, 
2001) using the numeric versions of the explanatory variables rather than categorical ones. 
Random forests are non-parametric models that do not presume a functional form for 
numeric explanatory variables, automatically include interactions if present and are robust 
to extreme values. The random forests ROC curve (black) evaluated on the validation set 
shown in Fig 4, does not perform as well as the logistic regression model. This further 
supports our additive model fit and how we chose to construct categorical versions of 
numeric variables. 
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B. FINAL MODEL FIT 
The structural part of a logistic regression model is usually written in terms of the 
log-odds of ( )( )log 1p p−  where for our model, p is the probability of attrition. The final 
model from the previous section is: 
 
( ) 0 1 1 7 7 1 1 2 2 3 3
1 1 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 3
log ...1
                                ...    ,
A A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y
FS FS FS FS E E E E E E
p x x x x xp
x x x x x
β β β β β β
β β β β β
  = + + + + + + − 
+ + + + + +   
where 0 3,..., Eβ β  are coefficients to be estimated and 1 7,...,A Ax x  are binary variables taking 
value 1 if ageFAC is (20, 25], …, (60, 90] respectively and 0 otherwise: 1 2 3, ,Y Y Yx x x  are 
the binary variables taking the value 1 if yearsIRFAC is (1,5], (5,10], (10,40] respectively 
and 0 otherwise; 1 4,...FS FSx x are the binary variables taking the value 1 if FSFAC is 
(5,10],…(25,60] respectively and 0 otherwise. 1 2 3, ,E E Ex x x , are binary variables that take 
value 1 if Ed is high school, a four year college degree, a master’s degree or higher 
respectively and zero otherwise.  
For each categorical variable, one level, the reference level, has a coefficient of 
zero and is left out of the logistic regression model. The reference levels are (17, 20],  
[0, 1], [0, 5] and no high school for ageFAC, yearsIRFAC, FSFAC, and Ed respectively. 
Table 3 gives the estimated coefficients and estimated p-values for the large sample Wald 
test that the corresponding coefficient is zero. 
  
30 
Table 3. Attrition Model Coefficients 
 Estimate Standard 
.Error 
Z Value P value 
Intercept -0.08 0.49 -0.169 0.865 
AgeFAC(20,25] -0.54 0.34 -0.157 0.115 
AgeFAC(25,30] -1.45 0.34 -4.199 0.000 
AgeFAC(30,35] -1.48 0.35 -4.269 0.000 
AgeFAC(35,40] -1.92 0.36 -5.400 0.000 
AgeFAC(40,45] -1.91 0.35 -5.461 0.000 
AgeFAC(45,50] -2.24 0.35 -6.318 0.000 
AgeFAC(50,55] -2.03 0.38 -5.289 0.000 
AgeFAC(55,60] -1.04 0.42 -2.707 0.007 
AgeFAC(60,90] -0.64 0.44 -1.468 0.142 
YearsIRFAC(1,5] -1.04 0.17 -6.100 0.000 
YearsIRFAC(5,10] -0.76 0.25 -3.074 0.002 
YearsIRFAC(10,40] -0.24 0.34 -0.724 0.469 
FSFAC(5,10] -0.64 0.10 -6.198 0.000 
FSFAC(10,15] -0.59 0.13 -4.435 0.000 
FSFAC(15,25] -0.95 0.14 -6.875 0.000 
FSFAC(25,60] -0.74 0.16 -4.704 0.000 
Ed1 -.036 0.21 -1.688 0.091 
Ed2 -0.72 0.22 -3.252 0.001 
Ed3 -0.74 0.24 -3.066 0.002 
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The overall attrition is 5.5 percent so the estimated probabilities are all very small, 
hence the estimate coefficients of the model are negative. Negative coefficients give 
negative estimated log odds, which explains estimated probabilities close to zero. For 
example, using this model, we can estimate the probability of attrition for a 25 year old 
with four years of federal service and a high school education. The estimated log odds for 
this individual is -0.863. In addition, the estimated probability of attrition for an individual 
of this type is 0.30. We can also derive a 95 percent confidence interval (CI) for the 
probability of attrition. The standard error for the estimated log-odds is 0.23 giving an 
approximate of 95% for the probability of [0.21, 0.39]. 
All else held constant, the probability of attrition is highest for 18 year olds. As age 
increases, probability of attrition goes down until the age of 50 and then it increases until 
the end. Probability of someone to attrite when they have one to five years to retire is lower 
than when an employee has more time left before they are eligible to retire. Employees 
with low credited federal service time have a higher attrition rate. Attrition rate then slows 
down between the 10 to 15 years, spikes at 15 to 25 years and then decreases at 25 to 60 
years of credited federal service time. Our model shows that employees with an education 
level of Bachelors or Masters are less likely to attrite compared with those with high school 
and no high school diplomas.  
We also use this model to estimate the probability of attrition for DA civilians as a 
function of age for age for different numbers of years of credited federal service (FS) and 
education levels. We note that the variable yearsIR and the categorical versions of 
yearsIRFAC are functions of age and FS. Table 4 gives the levels of years IRFAC 
corresponding to FS= 0 and the ages given in the Table 4. For completeness, we also show 





Table 4.  Explanatory Variables for Employees without Credited 
Federal Service  
Age ageFAC yearsIRFAC FSFAC 
20 (17, 20] (25,30] [0,5] 
25 (20,25] (20,25] [0,5] 
30 (25,30] (15,20] [0,5] 
35 (30,35] (15,20] [0,5] 
40 (35,40] (15,20] [0,5] 
45 (40,45] (10,15] [0,5] 
50 (45,50] (10,15] [0,5] 
55 (50,55] (5,10] [0,5] 
60 (55,60] (1,5] [0,5] 




Figure 5 shows the estimated probability of attrition with a 95 percent confidence 
intervals of DA civilians with an explanatory variable values given in Table 4 and no high 
school education. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated Probability of Attrition for DA Civilians with 95% 
Confidence Intervals for FS=0 and No High School Education as a 
Function of Age 
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Table 5 shows an explanatory variable for DA civilian employees with 10 years of 
FS as a function of age. Our age range is between 27 to 65 years of age given that the 
youngest employee in our data is 17 years old. Figure 6 shows estimated probability of DA 
employees with 10 years of FS and no high school diploma given age. Our study shows 
that with 10 years FS, the probability to attrite is approximate 0.08 between 27 and 35 years 
of age, then steadily decreases between the ages 35 and 60, and then spikes to 
approximately to a probability 0.15 between 60 and 65 years of age. 
Table 5. Explanatory Variable Values for Employees with 10 Years’ 
Credited Federal Service  
Age ageFAC yearsIRFAC FSFAC 
27 (25,30] (25,30] (10,40] 
35 (30,35] (20,25] (10,40] 
40 (35,40] (20,25] (10,40] 
45 (40,45] (10,15] (10,40] 
50 (45,50] (5,10] (10,40] 
55 (50,55] (5,10] (10,40] 
60 (55,60] (1,5] (10,40] 
65 (60,90] [0,1] (10,40] 
35 
  
Figure 6.  Estimated Probability of Attrition for DA Civilians with 95% 
Confidence Intervals for FS=10 and High School Education as a 
Function of Age 
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Table 6 gives variables values of employees with 20 years FS. The age range is 
between 37 to 65 years of age given that the youngest employee in our data is 17 years old. 
Table 6. Explanatory Variables Values for Employees with 20 
Years’ Credited Federal Service 
Age AgeFAC YearsIRFAC FSFAC 
37 (35,40] (15,20] (10,40] 
40 (35,40] (10,15] (10,40] 
45 (40,45] (10,15] (10,40] 
50 (45,50] (5,10] (10,40] 
55 (50,55] (5,10] (10,40] 
60 (55,60] (1,5] (10,40] 




Figure 7 shows estimated probability of attrition for DA civilian employees without 
a high school diploma to leave after 20 years of federal service. The estimated probability 
to leave is approximately 0.05 and remains stable between 37 to 45 years of age then it 
gradually decreases between 45 to 55, a slight increase between 55 to 60 before a steep 
increase between the age of 60 to 65. 
F 
Figure 7. Estimated Probability of Attrition for DA Civilians with 95% 
Confidence Intervals for FS=20 and No High School Education as a 
Function of Age 
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Figure 8 compares DA civilian employee estimated probability of attrition as a 
function of age for varying FS and education levels 1,2,3 corresponding to high school, 
four year degree, master’s degree or higher. 
 
Figure 8. Estimated Probabilities of Attrition for FS = 0,10, 20 (Columns) and 
Ed = 1, 2, 3 (Rows) 
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FS = 0, Ed = 1 graph in Figure 8 shows estimated probability of attrition for DA 
civilian employees without FS, but have a high school diploma. We have a higher estimated 
probability of attrition among the 17 olds at approximately 0.32, and then declines sharply 
among the 20 to 30 year olds at 0.1. We then see a steady estimated probability decline 
among 30 to 55 year olds. Finally, we see a steady increase in estimated probability from 
55 to 65 year olds. FS = 0, Ed = 2 follows the same pattern as FS= 0, Ed = 1 except the 
estimated probability of attrition drops by approximately 0.04 points throughout. There is 
no significant difference in estimated probability for attrition for FS =0, Ed = 3 and FS=0, 
Ed =2.  
Employees with FS = 10 estimated probability of attrition is lower than that of an 
employee with FS = 0. FS = 10, Ed = 1 graph on Figure 8 shows the estimated probability 
of DA employee with 10 years FS and a high school diploma to attrite. Estimated 
probability of attrition between 27 and 35 is stable at approximately 0.08. However, the 
estimated probability lowers from approximately 0.08 to approximately 0.06 at age 40 and 
gradually declines until age 50, and then it starts increasing with a peak of a little over 0.1 
at 65. FS =10, Ed = 2 and FS =10, Ed =3 follows similar pattern as FS =10, Ed = 1 except 
that the estimated probabilities of attrition are slightly lower but not significant than 
FS =10, Ed =1. 
  FS= 20, Ed =1, 2, 3 graphs show significantly low estimated probability of 
attrition among 37 and 60 year olds with FS = 20 at approximately 0.0002. Estimated 
probability of attrition then increases after 60 years of age to 0.1. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the use of logistic regression model to analyze the attrition 
of DA civilian data in CY 2009. We made conclusions and recommendations based on the 
results described in Chapter IV. 
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL CONCLUSION 
The logistic regression model showed a 5.5 percent attrition rate. Attrition based on 
age is as expected with younger and older employees leaving at a higher rate than the 
middle age group. It also shows that estimated probability of employees without high 
school education to leave federal workforce is always higher than that of an employee with 
a high school diploma and some college education. We also see that employees with 10 
years and more of FS have a lower probability to attrite between the ages 40 to 60. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
(1) Expand research to include the year before and a couple of years after CY 
2009 
In 2008, the U.S. suffered a recession. Poor economy would deter more people from 
retiring especially if their 401 Ks were tied to investments. Although we had more 
resignations than retirements from our data, the U.S. Army was conducting drawdowns 
causing employees to feel as if the future of their jobs was unstable therefore making a 
decision to leave for more stability. 
(2) Allow use of PII 
Lack of PII restricted the scope of research. For example, we were not able to 
identify organizational systematic issues due to scrambled UICs and ZIPs. Other PIIs such 
as number of dependents, health and life insurance enrollment are all indicators of whether 
an employee is a second income earner, which allow them to leave. In addition, UICs would 
allow the researcher to identify if we are losing employees to other federal agencies in the 
area. 
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(3) Allow appointment dates for current positions 
Appointment dates would allow us to see how long it takes the employee to 
progress in their career. Lack of progress could be an indicator for attrition. 
(4) Updated last transaction details 
40.8 percent of employees who separated last transaction detail does not state 
reason for separation. Availability of this information would help us in the future look at 
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